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of the

s·rATE OF UTAH

\X!EBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
, Case No.
9256

vs.
]. G[RT NELSON AND MYRTLE G.
NELSON, et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's statement of facts should be supplemented
to point out that contrary to the itnpression given by the
appellants' brief, only a small part of the 10.3 acres of land
condemned was good pasture land, and the farm was not
suited for a dairy operation at the time the action was filed.
Certain important details regarding appraised values and the
appellants' motion for judgment are also added.
3
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There is a duplication of paging in the record. References
) , and to the pleadings
to the transcript are designated ('fr.
and other papers in the file are designated (R.
).
The readers of the appellants' brief may get the idea
that the plaintiff was taking the heart out of a good dairy
farm. On page 4 it says, Clthe land taken includes all of the
natural pasture on appellants' farm." It is stated on page 5
that, Clprior to the enlargement of the reservoir, appellants
maintained a herd of 25 milking cows and 20 dry stock." As
a matter of fact n1ost of the land taken was steep hillside.
The appellants' expert, Mr. Story, said that of the 10.3
acres of land, 2 acres were crop land on top of the bench, and
one acre was ub-irrigated pasture. The remainder was nrolling
hillside'' with quaking aspen, choke cherry, grass, and a little
sage brush (Tr. 70-72). Mr. Kiepe said the land consisted of
three types, ( 1) land which had been under cultivation, (2)
''steep drop-off type of land,'' and ( 3) good pasture ( Tr. 131) .
He said that there were 2.8 acres of cultivated land and the
rest he put in one class for purposes of valuation and described it as Clsteep hillside and irregular grazing land, and
then those pockets where there was some sub-irrigated land''
(Tr. 132-133).
The sub-irrigated pasture was estimated at 1 acre by Mr.
Story, (Tr. 72) and at 1Vz to 2 acres by Mr. Warnick. The
good pasture with a high carrying capacity formerly used by
the appellants, \vas leased land which was not involved in
the suit. The lease expired in 1954, before the suit was filed.
See Exhibit F. It consisted of a Clbuffe.r area," (the land above
the original high water line of Pineview Reservoir and below
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the area taken in this suit), and land in the bed of the original
Pinevie\\' Reservoir. Mr. Warnick estimated the carrying
capacity of the leased land at 12-15 cows (Tr. 170) and the
carrying capacity of the 10.3 acres (excluding the 2 acres of
cultivated land) at 2 to 3 cows (Tr. 171-172). The topographic
map, plaintiffs Exhibit C, shows the steepness of the land
taken (area in red) and the locations of the good feed.
Mr. Kiepe described the farm as not suited for a dairy
operation before the taking. We quote:
A. Well, it was quite apparent to me, after talking
to the o\\rners, that they were making a very hard
st.:uggle out of trying to make a dairy farm out of the
property which could no longer be very satisfactorily
operated, particular! y at the conclusion of the lease,
the 20-year lease in~ 7 olving 76 acres down in the bottom. The struggle they had had to provide feed, green
feed, it was obvious because they were feeding hay the
year around, they were not turning the cattle back out
at night in order to take advantage of green feed, they
had leased out the ground and still hadn't been able
to n1ake it. They had taken about ten acres of their
top bench land to n1ake a pasture which cut short their
feed in the matter of grain and hay and it was very
obvious to me that this property, after their lease ended,
they didn't lose it because it ~7 as at the end of their
contract, after that contrac was ended, that this property should no longer be considered as a suitable dairy
operation. That was the end of it. So consequently, in
my opinion, the dairy barns and the milk house and
so forth were worthless except for a very nominal
amount to this property or to a new purchaser. They
\YOuld have a very nominal value because of the fact
that it v:as not suitable as a dairy operation.

s
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Q. Now, you are saying it was not suited as a dairy
operation as of March 25, 1957?
A. That is correct.

Q. And after the terminaton of the lease?
A. Well, it was my opinion when I made the inspection in 1955, but this is my opinion as of these
figures are as of March 1957.

Q. But you reached your conclusion with respect to
its not being a good dairy unit as of 195 5 when you
were on the property examining it?
A. I did. (Tr. 138, 139).
The appellants and respondent each had expert testimony
as to just compensation. 'fhe following is a tabulation of their
testimony:
Werner Kiepe
Land ------------------------------------------------------------------$3,040.00
Severance ---------------------------------------------------------- 500.00
$3,540.00
(Tr. 132, 133, 140)
Charles Story
Land ----------------------------------------------------------------$ 3, 862. 50
Severance on remaining land ------------------------ 6,900.00
Severance on buildings ---------------------------------- 10,745.40
Total ---------------------------------------··------------------------$21, 507.90
(Tr. 55, 62-67)
The jury verdict was $4,897 .00. But the difference in the
"before" and "after" values appearing in the answers to
special interrogatories was $5,396.90. There was obviously a
conflict between the general verdict and the answers to the
special interrogatories.

6
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After the verdict was rendered, but before judgment the
defendants filed the following document:
Motion for Entry of Judgment or For New Trial
Come no\v the above-named defendants, appearing
by and through their attorney of record, Glen E. Fuller,
and hereby move the court to enter judgment in the
above-entitled action in accordance with the general
verdict and the answers to special interrogatories submitted to the jury in said action in a manner consistent
in amount \Vith the evidence and the answers to the
special interrogatories; or in the alternative, that the
court order a nevv trial to be had. This motion is made
pursuant to Rule 49 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? and is based upon the apparent fact that no
judgtnent has been entered in said matter to this time.
It is requested that the clerk of the above-entitled
court set the above motion for hearing before the
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, at 11:00
A.M. on Monday, May 18, 1959.
Dated this 30th day of April, 1959.
Glen E. Fuller
Glen E. Fuller
Attorney for Defendants

(R. 76)
After argument the trial court made a memorandum
decision as follows:
The briefs submitted herein, together with my recall
of the trial, have been considered. I apologize to the
parties for the delay. I believed that I had disposed of
the n:a.tter last June until receipt of Mr. Fuller's letter
of 30 October 1959.
Judgment is to be entered for $5,397.00. It is my
belief that the apparent incorrectness in the verdict
7
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and the interrogatory is in reality a mathematical error
of 500 units (dollars; of course 90c is rounded off to
one dollar.)
$51,600.00
46,203.10
$ 5,396.90

I do not believe it necessarily follows, or even reasonably follov1s, that the jury reached these figures in
the way suggested by Mr. Fuller. There is a lot of give
and take in a jury room. Discussions there stop at some
figure and one may be accepted as just, by a juror even
though his view is not identical to that of the witness
who first suggested the figure. The verdict in this case
is fairly within the evidence.

•

I assume the jury attempted to follow my instructions
or the formula for fixing damages and erred in their
mathematics.
Dated this 13th day of November 1959.
John F. Wahlquist
Judge

(R. 79)
Judgment was entered for $5,397.00. The defendants
thereafter filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The judgment was properly entered under Ru1e 49 (b).
2. The appellants' motion for judgment based on the
answers to special interrogatories was granted and the appellants are estopped fron1 questioning the judgment on this
appeal.
8
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3. The trial court did not err in admitting witness Warnick's testimony.
4. The trial court did not err in giving instruction No. 12.

ARGUMENT
THE JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED UNDER
RULE 49 (b).
This is a typical case for the application of Rule 49 (b)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. There is a conflict between
the general verdict in the amount of $4,897.00 and the answers
to the special interrogatories, which by subtraction would
make the verdict $5,396.90. By the plain language of the rule
the trial court had authority to direct the entry of judgment
in accordance \Vith the answers. The following part of the
rule obviously applies.
\(When the answers are consistent with each other
but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict,
the court may direct the entry of judgment in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general
verdict, or may return the jury for further consideration
of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial."
The appellants rely on the following sentence in the rule:
((\Vhen the answers are inconsistent with each other
and one or more is like,vise inconsistent with the general
verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of judgment
but may return the jury for further consideration of
its answers and verdict or may order a new trial."
This last quoted sentence is not applicable because the
ans\vers to the interrogatories are not ((inconsistent with each
9
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other." There is nothing inconsistent between the answer that
the value before taking was $51,600.00, and the answer that
the value after taking was $46,203.10. The appellants assert
over and over again that the answers are inconsistent with each
other but fail to po1nt out the inconsistency.
The appellants attempt to inject into the problem an
analysis of the evidence and speculation as to why the jury
arrived at $51,600.00 and $46,203.10. Such analysis and
speculation are entirely out of order where, as here, the verdict
and judgment is supported by competent evidence. Weber
Basin Water Conservancy District v. Skeen, (Utah), 328
P.2d. 730. See also the case of Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea
Co., 5 Utah 2d 587, 299 P 2d. 622, where the rule is stated
as follows:
((This case having been tried to a jury, they were the
exclusive judges of the evidence and of the inferences
to be drawn therefrom. It was not the privilege of the
court to disagree with and overrule their action unless
the evidence so unerringly pointed to a contrary conclusion that there existed no reasonable basis for the
jury's finding. This court has many times affirmed
commitment to a policy of reluctance to interfere with
findings of fact and verdicts rendered by juries, and
has declared that it should be done only when the
matter is so clear as to be free from doubt."
To the same effect see Jensen v. Denver and R. W. R.
Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185; Heywood v. Denver and R.
W. R. Co., 6 Utah 2d. 155, 307 P.2d 1045.
The jury's ans\vers to interrogatories must be accepted by
the appellate court where it cannot say fron1 reading the record
that the answers are untrue.
10
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Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Relias, 99 Ind. App. 115, 185
N.E. 319.
The appellate court has not the power or insight to analyze
and speculate on the processes by which the jury arrived at their
conclusions.
Hanna v. Central States Electric Co.,
210 Iowa 864, 232 N. W. 421
City Transportation Co. v. V atsures,
278 S.W. 2d 373.
The answers to the special interrogatories are consistent
\vith each other and the trial court, pursuant to Rule 49 (b)
properly entered the judgment based on the answers.

THE APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JUDGMENT.
The appellants filed the motion, quoted in full above,
for the entry of judgment or for new trial. It is difficult to
determine from a reading of the document just what the
appellants sought as to .the amount of the judgment to be
entered. However, it appears from the following,
<(Come now the above-named defendants - and
hereby move the court to enter judgment-in accordance with the general verdict and the answers to the
special interrogatories submitted to the jury in said
action, in a manner consistent in amount with the evidence and the special interrogatories-." (Emphasis
added.)
that appellants by the motion sought to have the court enter
judgment for at least the amount of $5,396.10, which is the
11
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difference between the value of the farm, before and after
the taking, as reflected by the answers to the special interrogatories. The court entered the judgment for the increased
amount. Although at the time of the argument of the motion,
counsel for the appellants asserted that the judgment should
have been $8,000.00 based on his speculative analysis of the
evidence, the court increased the award only about $500.00.
Nevertheless the increase was the court's ruling on the motion.
See the court's memorandum decision above.
The following general rule is applicable:
((Since a party may appeal only from an involuntary
adverse judgment, it is a well settled general rule declared in some states by express statutory provision,
that a party 1s not aggrieved by a judgment, order,
decree or ruling regularly rendered or made, on agreement or otherwise, with his express or implied consent, and therefore he cannot appeal or sue out a writ
of error to review it . . . Under this general rule, a
party generally is estopped or waives right to appeal
or bring error where a judgment, order or decree was
entered on his motion ... " 4 C.J.S. see 213, pp. 629631. (Emphasis added.)
The appellants cannot now question the judgment entered
on their motion.

WITNESS WARNICK'S TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED.
The appellants contend that Mr. Warnick was not qualified
to testify as to the carrying capacity of the land taken for the
grazing of cattle.

12
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Mr. Warnick testified that he was raised on a farm in
Millard County and remained on the farm until he was 22
years old; that it was an all-purpose farm. He said:
''We had about 10 to 15 dairy cows and a small
flock of sheep and a few beef animals and a number
of horses." (Tr. 166).
In addition to his experience on the farm Mr. Warnick
is a civil engineer with many years experience in planning
irrigation developments and in making studies of farm lands.

Q. Now, Mr. Warnick, have you had other experience since you becatne a civil engineer with respect to
analysis of farms and carrying capacities and so on?
A. Yes, sir; I've been in the planning of irrigation
developments since 1942 in various locations throughout Colorado and Utah and have been responsible for
economic analysis of farm developments, what they
can produce and an economy of work connected with
them. I have done work in Kamas and Heber Valley~
Utah and Weber Basin, Utah and Gunnison, Colorado
area in Colorado. (Tr. 166).
Mr. Warnick testified that he was familiar with the land
involved in this suit, he described in detail the types of vegetation on the land, and when asked whether he had an opinion
as to the animal carrying capacity of the land to be condemned
he said, CCI do" (Tr. 166-169).
The law is well settled that a skilled or expert witness
is one possessing, with regard to a particular subject, knowledge or experience not acquired by the ordinary person. It has
been held that although there is no exact standard for fixing
the qualifications of such witness, ordinarii y, if he has had
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experience or tratntng which would enable him to form a
judgment of a probative value, he is qualified to testify.
32 C.J.S. pp. 94-96
The determination of the qualification of a witness to
state his opinion is for the trial court.
Walkinhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P2d. 654
Whether or not the qualification of a witness to state his
opinion is sufficiently established is a matter resting largely
in the discretion of the trial court.
32 C.J.S. p. 99
Graham v. Ogden Union Ry. etc. Co.
79 Utah 1, 6 P 2d 465.
In re Hanson's Estate.
87 Utah 580, 52 P 2d 1103.
Ordinarily the ruling of the trial court will not be
disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing of abuse.
If the witness has some qualifications, he should be permitted
to testify.
In the case of In Re Hanson's Estate, supra, this Court
said:
((The matter of proper foundation or qualification
of a \vitness to state a conclusion, an opinion or an
impression, where the same is permissible in evidence,
lies largely in the sound discretion of the trial court.
Unless it appears that the evidence of underlying or
(sense' facts is so inadequate as would compel this
court to say as a 1natter of law that the trial court
had erred in permitting a conclusion to be stated,
the pern1itting of such conclusion to be stated will not
be disturbed.''

14
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In the case of Wray v. Fairfield Amusement Co., 126
Conn. 221, lOA 2d 600, the court held that if any reasonable
qualifications can be established for an expert witness, the
objection goes to the weight rather than to the admissibility
of the testimony.
It has been held that perm1tttng testimony 1s not error
if the witness has even slight qualifications.
Lutz v. Allegheny County, 327 Pa. 587,
195 A. 1
Davis v. Southern Surety Co.
302 Pa. 21, 153 A. 119
Delaware etc. Co. v. Starrs, 59 Pa. 36
Yorkshire Worsted Mills v. National Transit Co.
28 Del Co. 402
It is submitted that Mr. Warnick was qualified to testify
and that the trial court properly ruled that the testimony was
admissible.

,(

II'

It is argued by the appellants that the jury's answer to
special interrogatory number 3 to the effect ((that the highest
and best use of the farm before taking was (crop farm with
very limited number of livestock' leaves no doubt but that the
testimony of Mr. Warnick on the subject of the carrying
capacity of the 10.3 acres of land was accepted by the jury."
This argument is obviously unsound in view of the testimony
of Mr. Kiepe and Mr. Story mentioned above as to the very
liinited area of good pasture, and the fact that the jury viewed
the premises. The jury no doubt based its answers on all of
the testimony in the record. We cannot assume otherwise.

15
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 12 WAS CORRECT.
The appellants complain that instruction to the jury No.
12 was erroneous, misleading and prejudical. The instruction
properly and specifically pointed out that the appellants were
entitled to damages for diminution in value of the remaining
lands, and improven:cnts. The same thought is expressed
in instruction No. 5 as follows:
<(2. The damages, if any, to the defendants' remain-

ing land and structures not taken, caused by the plaintiff
by taking of the said 10.3 acres of land."
See also instruction No. 8 (R. 54) which was given at the
appellants' request. ·This latter instruction speciilcally mentioned the claim of a dairy farm operation.
Upon analysis of instruction No. 12 is it clear that there
is nothing therein which negatives in any manner the statement
that the appellants were entitled to damages to the remaining
land and buildings.
Instruction No. 12 was necessary to point out the distinction between damages to remaining land and improvements,
on the one hand, and damage to a dairy business, as such, on
the other. Mrs. 1v1yrtle Nelson testified on direct examination
that she and her husband had a dairy setup for Grade A milk,
and that the farm had been operated for dairy purposes for
2 5 years ( T r. 21) . Mr. Story based his testimony as to value
on the land being suitable for, and theretofore used for a dairy
business (Tr. 59).
The distinction made in instruction No. 12 is valid. The
landowner is undoubtedly entitled to diminution in value
16
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of rematntng land and buildings caused by the taking but
not for damages to the dairy business, t(regardless of who
conducted it on the land."
In Just Con1pensation, by Kaltenback, page 23, it 1s
stated:
"A majority of the decisions deny the consideration
of business damages in the absence of a specific statute
authorizing their consideration."
Under familiar rules the instructions must be considered
as a whole, and when so considered it is clear that the jury
was proper1y instructed that damages to remaining land and
buildings could be considered. The form of verdict set out a
space for the insertion of an amount for ''severance to property
not taken" ( R. 69) .
The appellants argue that the ninadequate severance
award supports the appellants' contention that the jury was
misled by instruction No. 12." Mr. Kiepe testified that severance damages amounted to $500.00. Mr. Story testified that
they amounted to $17,645.40. The jury award under item 2,
"Just compensation for severance damage to property not
taken," was $1,847.00. The award was $1,347.00 higher than
Mr. Kiepe's estimate, and it is entirely speculative as to what
items were not included by the jury. However, it is certain
that the award was for "damage to property not taken." It was
well within the evidence.
The testimony of Mr. Kiepe (Tr. 138, 139) is competent
testimony that the appellants vvere out of the dairy business
\vhen their lease of the bottom pasture land expired. This was
before the condemnation case was filed. The jury could have
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limited the severance damages because of their belief that the
expiration of the lease, and not the taking of the small acreage
( 1 to 2 acres) of good pasture reduced the values.
The appellants have failed to show either that the instruction was wrong, or if not, that it was prejudicial.

CONCLUSION
The judgment based on the answers to the special interrogatories is supported by competent evidence. Mr. Kiepe's
testimony would have supported a verdict as low as $3,540.00.
It is not the province of this Court to speculate on how the
jury arrived at the verdict and the judgment must be sustained
as it was fairly within the evidence. The ruling of the trial
court on the admissibility of Mr. W aJ;~ick' s testimony was
correct, and the jury was properly instructed on matters of law.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should be
affirmed.
E. J. SKEEN
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD

Attorneys for Respondent
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